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Anarchy In The Airways
Abstract
In his dialogue - Anarchy In The Airways - Joseph C. Von Kornfeld, Assistant Professor, College of Hotel
Administration, University of Nevada, Las Vegas initially states: “Deregulation of the airline industry has
brought about financial vulnerability for the traveling public. The author analyzes the situation since that point
in time and makes recommendations for some solutions.”
In this article, Assistant Professor Von Kornfeld, first defines the airline industry in its pre-regulated form.
Then he goes into the ramifications and results of deregulating the industry, both in regards to the consumer,
and in deregulation’s impact on the airlines themselves.
“The most dramatic consequence of the pressures and turbulence of airline deregulation has been the
unprecedented proliferation of airline bankruptcies,” Von Kornfeld informs.
“Prior to the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, U.S. air carriers operated in a business
environment that was insulated from the normal stresses and strains of open competition. They were
restricted from actively competing with fares and routings by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),” Von
Kornfeld says.
In leveling the playing field, Von Kornfeld offers, “Each carrier was restricted to specific geographic routes,
with those routes limited to two or three competing carriers.
The only thing that set carriers apart in this CAB defined atmosphere was their ability to either advertise, or to
enhance their level of service; or both. “…ultimately paid for by the passenger through fare increases
sanctioned by the CAB,” Von Kornfeld states.
“Airline service standards were unquestionably superior during the regulated environment,” Von Kornfeld
renders an interesting observation.
He does mention, however, that carrier safety was also considered a concern immediately prior to, and then
after deregulation. “The major controversy focused on the allegation that safety and maintenance standards
would be compromised due to the financial pressures brought about by an openly competitive environment,”
Von Kornfeld says.
Pricing, as well as labor unions are important factors in the equation, and Von Kornfeld addresses their
relevance in the deregulated environment.
“The primary rationalization for deregulation was to facilitate a more openly competitive environment. The
increased competition was to ultimately have benefitted the consumer. Ironically, that’s not entirely the case,
Von Kornfeld elaborates.
In addressing some of the negative aspects of airline deregulation, Von Kornfeld suggests that some sort of
federal re-regulation may be in order.
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Anarchy In The Airways 
by 
Joseph C. Von Kornfeld 
Assistant Professor, College of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Deregulation of theairline industry has brought about financial vulnerability 
for the traveling public. The author analyzes the situation since that point 
in time and makes recommendations for some solutions. 
Prior to the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978, U.S. 
air carriers operated in a business environment that was insulated from 
the normal stresses and strains of opencompetition. They were restricted 
from actively competing with fares and routings by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB). Any variation of the standard determinants of growth and 
profitability, such as capitalization, equipment utilization, cost controls, 
and productivity, had minimal impact in enhancing one carrier's posi- 
tion over another. Each carrier was restricted to specific geographic 
routes, usually limited to two or three competing carriers. The dominant 
carriers with larger fleets were effectively prohibited from expanding 
their route structure and encroaching on the markets of existing 
competitors. 
Considering that all fares were identical within the specified pro- 
tected route structures of theindividualcarriers, themarketing strategy 
that could be employed in order to increase market share was essential- 
ly limited to two costly methods. The first was extravagant advertis- 
ing and promotional campaigns among the competing carriers, with the 
primary benefactor being the advertising agencies. The other was pro- 
duct variation and enhancement. Both factors had a significant and tangi- 
ble impact upon a carrier's reputation and identity within the 
marketplace, although ultimately paid for by the passenger through fare 
increases sanctioned by the CAB. 
Airline service standards were unquestionably superior during the 
regulated environment; for example; food service was far more lavish 
and appealing due to the diversity of menu planning and a higher stan- 
dard of quality in both preparation and presentation. There was ample 
comfort for passengers. This usually meant fewer available seats per air- 
craft which warranted an increase in the frequency of service, which, in 
turn, meant fewer passengers per plane. All of these factors contributed 
to high operatingcosts, with little incentive for cost containment. Any 
increases in operating costs were usually negated by routinely apply- 
ing for fare increases by documenting the increased costs to the CAB, 
which inmost cases was found to be justified. Additionally, management 
had little incentive to contain labor costs as increased payroll expen- 
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ditures also contributed to the justification for increased fares by the 
CAB. This scenario perpetuated itself for decades and is the primary 
reason why the airline industry has traditionally offered extravagant 
salaries and very lucrative fringe benefits. 
With deregulation on the horizon in the mid '70s, the larger carriers 
were for the most part in favor of it, and the smaller carriers were oppos- 
ed. The major controversy focused on the allegation that safety and 
maintenance standards would be compromised due to the financial 
pressures brought about by an openly competitive environment. The r e  
cent increase in accidents and fatalities has revived this controversy and 
has facilitated additional concern and support regarding this allegation. 
The deregulation of the airline industry occurred in phases starting 
in 1978 with the substantial expansion of the route structures of the ex- 
isting carriers; subsequently, a laissez-faire pricing structure evolved. 
The final phase of deregulation culminated with the complete abolition 
of the CAB on December 31,1984. Another significant factor during the 
transition period was the entry of a multitude of new carriers into the 
marketplace. Initially, the existing carriers weren't concerned, as they 
were in a far better position in terms of capitalization, expertise, and 
identity. 
However, there was a revolutionary change in the marketing 
strategies that could now be employed by the various air carriers. Airlines 
traditionally had two strategic options. First, they could competein terms 
of product variation and enhancement and with advertising and promo- 
tional campaigns. Second, price and routes had become unprecedented 
and effective variants of the marketing options available. For the first 
time, the airlines were exposed to open competition which translated into 
survival of the fittest. 
The new carriers entering the marketplace had one primary com- 
petitive advantage: far lower labor costs. The new carriers were non- 
union; therefore, management had absolute discretion in setting salary 
scales and fringe benefits. Additionally, the management philosophy of 
the new carriers stressed cross-training and utilization of personnel, which 
ensured higher productivity. In contrast, the traditional carriers were 
compelled to deal with as many as six different labor unions per airline. 
They were confronted withunproductive and archaic work rules, and with 
militant employees who had substantial seniority with greater allegiance 
to their respective unions rather than to the companies that employed 
them. The dichotomy of the methods of management between the old 
and new carriers contributed to amore fiercely competitive environment. 
Something had to give, and the passenger was caught in the crosswind. 
'The Passenger Is The Creditor 
In this credit-oriented economy, the provider of goods and services 
is usually perceived as the creditor. Whether for the purchase of a set 
of luggage, for checking into a hotel, or for obtaining a meal in a 
restaurant, the consumer has the goods conveyed to his possession or 
the services rendered, and only then, through either a formal credit con- 
tract or by custom, is payment made. 
FIU Hospitality Review, Voulme 5, Number 1, 1987
Copyright: Contents © 1987 by FIUHospitality Review. Thereproduction of any artwork,
editorial, or other materialis expressly prohibited without written permission from
the publisher.
The purchase of an airline ticket provides an unconventional perspec- 
tive. If viewed objectively, a passenger is required to pay for passage 
in full prior to embarkation by cash, check, or credit card. The airline will 
then issue a ticket, usually agreeing to provide passage on a specified 
future date. If the ticket is not purchasedin advance, it is highly unlike- 
ly that the desired flight will be available. This procedure renders the 
passenger financially vulnerable for a loss in the event that an air car- 
rier cannot provide for the agreed passage or for a refund of the amount 
rendered. 
Compounding the financial vulnerability of the airline passenger still 
further is the advance purchase requirement in order to qualify for dis- 
count fares. This type of promotional fare, sometimes referred to as 
" Super-saver" or "Ultra-Saver," requires the passenger to purchase the 
ticket prior to departure in order to qualify for a significant discount. 
The advance purchase requirement usually ranges from three to 30 days. 
Lately, however, the trend has been toward the 30-day requirement. 
The availability of advance purchase discount seats is restricted in 
yet another manner, through controlled capacity. This concept means 
that the airlines allocate a specific block of seats for a specific promo- 
tional fare on designated flights correlated with internal load factor 
statistical data. The reality of this practice usually requires the passenger 
to purchase his Super- Saver ticket as much as 60 days in advance in order 
to qualify for a seat on a flight of his or her choosing. I t  is interesting 
to note that an airline is not required to disclose how many, or if any, dis- 
count seats were allocated for a particular flight. 
Another factor to consider is that in the event a passenger secures 
a seat on a Super-saver fare basis, he or she is usually subject to a 25 or 
50 percent penalty factor if helshe should change an itinerary or cancel 
a reservation due to unforeseen circumstances. If the trend continues, 
it is highly probable that some air carriers will require the forfeiture of 
the entire fare in the event of a cancellation. Conversely, if an air carrier 
cannot accommodate a passenger with a confirmed reservation due to 
a flight cancellation, there is no regulatory remedy available to the 
passenger. Flight cancellations can be attributed to inadequate crew staf- 
fing, mechanical problems, equipment shortages, or inclement weather. 
Passengers Incur Expenses 
In many cases, passengers left stranded due to flight cancellations 
incur increased travel expenses for hotel accommodations, meals, andlor 
alternate transportation. The inconvenience and expense of being strand- 
ed can also be attributed to missed connections due to numerous factors. 
There is no regulatory remedy available to the passenger once again. 
These stranded passenger scenarios are not to be confused with those 
passengers who are denied boarding due to the overbooking of a particular 
flight. In this case there is a regulatory remedy known as the Denied Boar- 
ding Compensation Act, previously enforced by the CAB and now under 
the purview of theDepartment of Transportation. Needless to say, this 
paradox in cancellation policies places the passenger in an inequitable, 
precarious, and uncompromising situation which is inconsistent with 
most consumer transactions. 
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Prior to deregulation, if apassenger could not be accommodated due 
to a cancelled flight or missed connection, most air carriers would pro- 
vide alternate transportation, hotel accommodations, and meals. This 
was a customary practice in order to retain the goodwill of the passenger 
and to protect the reputation of the airline. Additionally, prior to deregula- 
tion, the CAB would not permit fare structures to be established on a 
controlled capacity basis, as they could be perceived as loss leaders which 
could contribute to "bait and switch" activities. The airlines were also 
prohibited from imposing penalty factors due to cancellations. 
Management's rationale for the pricing structure of advance pur- 
chase (Super-saver) fares has a two-fold approach. From a marketing 
point of view, the advance purchase requirement and other restrictions 
make the fare inconvenient and inaccessible for the committed (business 
traveler) segment of the market; at the same time, it stimulates demand 
from the discretionary (pleasure traveler) segment of the marketplace 
which tends to be price sensitive. Secondly, from a financial point of view, 
this pricing strategy obviously enhances the cash flow position of any 
carrier receivingrevenue for services which aren't required to be provided 
until some distant point in the future. 
Recent promotional trends indicate that some carriers are engag- 
ing in highly imprudent pricing practices. As an example, if a ticket is 
purchased at present at the regular rate, the passenger is then eligible 
to purchase a ticket on a 2-for-1 basis at some distant date which can be 
as much as six months in the future. Another unorthodox advancepur- 
chase promotion encourages buying four tickets to a specific destina- 
tion and receiving four more at no cost. These practices can and should 
be viewed as a distress sale, indicating a severe cash flow problem. 
Airline Casualties Increase 
The most dramatic consequence of the pressures and turbulence of 
airline deregulation has been the unprecedented proliferation of airline 
bankruptcies. 
Since the Airline Deregulation Act was implemented in 1978,53 
scheduled air carriers have filed for bankruptcyprotectionunder Chapter 
11. Table 1 illustrates the names of the scheduled air carriers and theyears 
in which they filed for bankruptcy. Some of the carriers may not be 
familiar, as they operated as regional or feeder carriers with routings con- 
fined to specific geographic regions of the country. 
The primary rationalization for deregulation was to facilitate a more 
openly competitive environment. The increased competition was to 
ultimately have benefitted the consumer. Ironically, however, the Depart- 
ment of Justice's Anti-Trust Division has radically changed its policies 
by approving airline mergers and take-overs in an unprecedented man- 
ner, which ultimately can and will minimize competition. This revolu- 
tionary change in policy was necessitated in order to minimize the pro- 
spect of additional airline bankruptcies. I t  is entirely possible that within 
the next two to three years there may be only seven or eight major trunk 
carriers. 
Table 1 clearly demonstrates the financial vulnerability of the travel- 
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Table 1 
The following scheduled air carriers filed for bankruptcy pro- 
tection since the inception of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: 
1979 
Aeroamerica American Central 
*Mackey International *New York Airways 
1980 
Florida Airlines Indiana Airways 
1981 
Air Bahia Apollo Airways (later 
Coral Air Pacific Coast Airlines) 
Golden Gate Airlines *LANICA 
Mountain West Airlines Tejas Airlines 
1982 
Aero Virgin Islands AeroSun International 
Air North Air Pennsylvania 
Air South Altair Airlines 
Astec Air East *Braniff International 
Cochise Airlines North American Airlines 
Silver State Airlines Swift Aire Lines 
Will's Airlines 
1983 
*Continental Airlines Golden West Airlines 
Inland Empire Airlines National Florida Airlines 
State Airlines 
1984 
*Air Florida Air Illinois 
Air Vermont American International 
Atlantic Gulf Combs Airways 
Dolphin Airways Emerald 
Excellair Hamrnond's Commuter Air Service 
New York Helicopter Oceanair Line 
Pacific Air East Pacific Express 
Wien Airlines Wright Airlines 
1985 
Northeastern International *Provincetown-Boston Airlines 
1986 
Pride Air Air Hawaii 
*Frontier Airlines 
* Designates air carriers in operation prior to the deregulation act of 1978. 
ing public. 3xact losses quotable in dollars would be extremely difficult 
to ascertain, as the bankruptcy proceedings were held in a variety of 
federal bankruptcy court jurisdictions, and many prospective passengers 
have never filed a creditor's claim. I t  is also important to note that in 
the case where a passenger has filed a claim, indemnification would be 
highly unlikely, as the unaccommodated passenger would be deemed to 
be an unsecured creditor, placing him or her in a low priority status. 
Preference in theliquidation of the assets of a bankrupt company would 
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be prioritized by taxes owed to federal and state authorities, employee 
payroll obligations, secured creditors such as the providers of equipment 
and facilities, and unsecured creditors such as unaccommodated 
passengers, respectively. 
In the past, commercial aviation was under the strict regulation of 
the federal government. Jurisdiction was shared by the Federal Avia- 
tion Administration (FAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The 
FAA is still intact, providing safety and technical oversight; however, 
since the demise of the CAB, there has been a complete regulatory void, 
leaving the traveling public totally exposed to deceptive trade practices, 
inferior service standards, and financial vulnerability. The Department 
of Transportation has inherited some of the jurisdictional responsibili- 
ty from the CAB, but has demonstrated little concern in protecting the 
public interest. Most of the transgressions and inequities would not be 
tolerated within the customary consumer environment existing under 
regulatory laws of the various states. Historically, however, there has 
never been a need for state intervention or regulation except in the mat- 
ter of intrastate air routes, so a void exists here as well. 
I t  is obvious that some sort of modified reregulation is justified in 
order to at least protect the financial interests of the traveling public. 
The CAB had provided stability and financial solvency to the airways, 
and since its demise there have been phenomenal losses to both the con- 
sumers and the airline industry, which have contributed to anarchy in 
the airways. 
Legislative Remedies May Be In Order 
One would assume that purchasing a cruise ticket for passage on 
a foreign flag cruise line would place the prospective passenger at far 
greater financial risk, considering that the average cost of a seven-day 
cruiseis $1,500 per person. In most instances, a minimum of two people 
travel together, which would amount to a cash outlay of $3,000. Addi- 
tionally, most cruise passengers will book space far in advance, usually 
three to four months. This is a comparable situation to that of the airline 
passenger, whereby the passenger is the creditor and any number of un- 
foreseen circumstances could place the prospective passengers' funds 
in jeopardy. Situations could arise, such as damage to or the loss of a ship, 
labor disputes, or international political turmoil, as well as a declaration 
of bankruptcy. Any prospect of legal restitution would be further com- 
plicated and expensive by virtue of having to deal with various ramifica- 
tions of international and admiralty law. 
The reality of this cruiselairline passenger analogy is quite the con- 
trary, due primarily to the fact that the Federal Maritime Commission 
(FMC) requires that any passenger vessel embarking from a U.S. port 
must file a certificate of financial responsibility to provide for the indem- 
nification of passengers in the event of non-performance of transporta- 
tion. This performance or surety bond is required pursuant to Sub-Part 
A, Part 540, Title 46 of the United States Code of Federal Regulation. 
Taking this pertinent precedent provided by the regulatory policy 
of the FMC into consideration, a legislative remedy is obviously called 
for in order to provide comparable financial protection to the airline 
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passenger, under the auspices of the Department of Transportation. 
I t  would also be in the best interests of the various scheduled air car- 
riers to post a surety bond in order to facilitate the restoration of the 
public's confidence in commercial aviation. 
Until the time comes that some sort of modified reregulation is 
enacted, it might be in the best interest of the airline passenger to ascer- 
tain the financial solvency of the prospective air carrier with his 
stockbroker prior to placing his reservation with the airline. 
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